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UNUSUAL STATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS
William W. Berry III*
Abstract
This Article argues that many of the states that retain the death penalty
currently violate their own state constitutions because their use of the
death penalty is unusual. Specifically, an intrastate assessment of the
death penalty in some states, particularly examining its use across
counties, suggests that the rareness of its use might mean that it has
become an unusual punishment. As a result, this Article explores the
twenty-six capital states that proscribe “unusual” punishments and
categorizes them based on the likelihood that their use of the death
penalty violates their state constitutions.
Part I of this Article explains the concept of unusualness under the
Eighth Amendment as developed by the United States Supreme Court in
its capital cases. In Part II, this Article explores the Eighth Amendment
analogues in state constitutions that similarly prohibit unusual
punishments and the conjunctive and disjunctive language of the state
constitutions, before demonstrating how the Eighth Amendment
approach could translate to the analysis of unusualness under state
constitutional law. Part III then examines the states that have unusual
punishment proscriptions in their state constitutions and categorizes the
states based on the likelihood that their use of the death penalty violates
their state constitutions. Finally, in Part IV, this Article argues for an
expansive application of state constitutions to bar unusual state capital
punishments, exploring the policy reasons supporting this analytical
move.
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................3
I.

EIGHTH AMENDMENT UNUSUALNESS .........................................6
A. Furman v. Georgia ..............................................................7
B. The Evolving Standards of Decency ...................................8

II.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL UNUSUALNESS ..................................15
A. State Constitutional Analogues to the
Eighth Amendment ...........................................................16
B. Conjunctives and Disjunctives .........................................18
C. Counties as Analogues for States .....................................20

* Associate Professor, University of Mississippi School of Law; D.Phil. in Law,
University of Oxford; J.D., Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank Andrew Rock for his
outstanding research assistance on this Article, and the Florida Law Review for their excellent
editorial work in preparing this Article for publication.
1

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

2

III.

[Vol. 72

UNUSUAL STATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS ................................24
A. De Facto Abolition States.................................................24
1. The States (California, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Utah, and Wyoming) .................................................24
a. California ...........................................................24
b. Colorado .............................................................25
c. Idaho ..................................................................25
d. Kansas ................................................................26
e. Kentucky ............................................................26
f. Montana .............................................................27
g. Nebraska ............................................................27
h. Oregon ...............................................................28
i. Pennsylvania .....................................................28
j. South Dakota .....................................................29
k. Utah ...................................................................29
l. Wyoming ...........................................................30
2. Possible State Constitutional Consequences .............30
B. Evolved Standards States .................................................32
1. The States (Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia,
Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) .................32
a. Arizona ...............................................................32
b. Arkansas .............................................................33
c. Georgia ...............................................................33
d. Indiana................................................................34
e. Louisiana ............................................................34
f. Mississippi .........................................................35
g. Missouri .............................................................35
h. South Carolina ...................................................36
i. Tennessee ...........................................................36
j. Virginia ..............................................................37
2. Possible State Constitutional Consequences .............38
C. Status Quo States (For Now) ............................................39
1. The States (Alabama, Florida, Nevada,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas) ..........39
a. Alabama .............................................................39
b. Florida ................................................................39
c. Nevada ...............................................................40
d. North Carolina ...................................................40
e. Ohio....................................................................41
f. Oklahoma ...........................................................41
g. Texas ..................................................................42

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss1/1

2

Berry: Unusual State Capital Punishments

UNUSUAL STATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS

2020]

2.
IV.

3

Possible State Constitutional Consequences .............43

THE CASE FOR BARRING UNUSUAL STATE
CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS ............................................................43
A. Capital Punishments Are Unusual in Many States ..........44
B. Judicial Political Accountability ......................................44
C. State Constitutions Are Not Fixed ....................................45
D. A Check Against Rogue Prosecutors ................................46

CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................47
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, there were twenty-five executions in the United States, one
of the lowest numbers of executions since the Supreme Court reinstated
the death penalty in 1976.1 The number of new death sentences in 2018—
forty-five—was also one of the lowest since 1976.2 This continued a trend
over the past two decades of declining use of the death penalty and
declining death sentences.3
With the use of capital punishment decreasing to pre-Furman v.
Georgia4 levels,5 many abolitionists hoped that the Supreme Court might
again find that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment, as the
increasing rareness of its use is making it an increasingly unusual
punishment, even for aggravated murder.6 Adding support to this
movement was Justice Breyer’s lengthy dissent in Glossip v. Gross7 in
2015, also joined by Justice Ginsburg, which highlighted the panoply of
problems with the death penalty and its administration and further
1. See The Death Penalty in 2018: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 14,
2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEnd2018 [https://perma.cc/56HG-TLNQ].
2. Death Penalty in 2018: Facts and Figures, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 10, 2019, 1:01 UTC),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/death-penalty-facts-and-figures-2018/ [https://
perma.cc/99JK-5RUP]. In 2016, there were only thirty-one new death sentences. 2016 Death
Sentences
by
Name,
Race,
and
County, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/sentencing-data/death-sentences-by-name-raceand-county/2016-death-sentences-by-name-race-and-county [https://perma.cc/8EKP-2JN6].
3. The Death Penalty in 2018: Year End Report, supra note 1 (showing these declines over
time).
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
5. The use of the death penalty was at an all-time low in the United States in the decade
before the Supreme Court decided Furman, which held that the death penalty, as applied, violated
the Eighth Amendment. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1,
19 (2007).
6. See The Case Against the Death Penalty, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (2012),
https://www.aclu.org/other/case-against-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/C9E4-GKYA].
7. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
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suggested that the Court revisit the question of its constitutionality.8 With
a slim 5–4 majority that had created categorical limitations to the death
penalty in 2002,9 2005,10 2008,11 2014,12 and 2017,13 a grant of certiorari
to reexamine the constitutionality of the death penalty seemed like a real
possibility.14
In early 2018, however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Hidalgo v. Arizona,15 a case that posed the question of whether the death
penalty itself, and as applied in Arizona, violated the Eighth
Amendment.16 Four Justices—Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan—wrote a four-page statement respecting the denial of certiorari,
explaining in part that the record in Hidalgo was inadequately developed
to assess the questions raised by the petitioner.17 At the end of the 2018
Term, Justice Kennedy, one of the five Justices in the majority of the
recent decisions limiting the death penalty,18 retired from the Supreme
Court.19 His replacement appears far less likely to embrace decisions
limiting the scope of the death penalty, much less abolition.20
Even though the Supreme Court seems unlikely to address the
constitutionality of the death penalty in the near future, that does not
mean that the death penalty will remain free from judicial scrutiny. In
December 2018, the Washington Supreme Court declared the death
penalty unconstitutional under state constitutional law.21 Specifically, the
court held that the death penalty was arbitrary and racially discriminatory,
making it a cruel and unusual punishment.22
8. Id. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
10. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
11. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
12. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014).
13. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017).
14. Justices on both sides of the political divide seem to devalue the concept of stare decisis
under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 556, 578, rev’g Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 310, 321, abrogating Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991), abrogating Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277 (1983).
15. 138 S. Ct. 1054 (2018).
16. Id. at 1054.
17. Id. at 1057.
18. See cases cited supra notes 9–13.
19. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedyretire-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/66KS-EBRL].
20. See, e.g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019) (upholding a brutal,
torturous execution).
21. State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 642 (Wash. 2018).
22. Id.
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The holding of the Washington Supreme Court raises the possibility
that the death penalty might violate state constitutions in certain
jurisdictions. While there are a number of possible theories that might
support such a conclusion, this Article explores one—unusualness. As
explored below, almost all of the states that retain the death penalty have
language in their state constitutions analogous to the Eighth Amendment
prohibiting unusual punishments.23
Applying a theoretical approach similar to the U.S. Supreme Court in
Furman and Gregg v. Georgia,24 states could find that they use the death
penalty so infrequently as to make it an unusual punishment. The
Supreme Court’s approach in these cases and its evolving-standards-ofdecency doctrine more generally have focused on interstate comparisons
to determine if the death penalty (or a particular manifestation of it)
constitutes an unconstitutionally unusual punishment.25 In other words, a
type of death sentence might occur so infrequently as to make it unusual
and, as a result, unconstitutional.26
Replicating that type of analysis at the state level using an intrastate
perspective, one can assess whether the infrequent use of the death
penalty within a state might indicate that the state’s capital punishment
system is unusual, in contravention of the state’s constitution. Instead of
comparing states, as the Supreme Court does when examining
applications of the death penalty under the federal constitution, the
analysis under a state constitution would examine the use of the death
penalty across the counties of a particular state.
In pursuing this line of analysis, this Article argues that many of the
states that retain the death penalty currently violate their own
constitutions because their use of the death penalty is unusual. An
intrastate assessment of the death penalty in some states, particularly
examining its use across counties, suggests that the rareness of its use
might mean that it has become unusual punishment. As a result, this
Article explores the twenty-six capital states that proscribe “unusual”
punishments and categorizes them based on the likelihood that their use
of the death penalty violates their state constitutions.
Part I of this Article explains the concept of unusualness under the
Eighth Amendment as developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its cases.
In Part II, this Article explores the Eighth Amendment analogues in state
23. See infra Part II; William W. Berry III, Cruel State Punishments, [ ] N.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (exploring the conjunctive and disjunctive nature of such provisions).
24. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422–34, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–68 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–17
(2002).
26. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (noting that a
punishment can be unusual if it is infrequently imposed).
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constitutions that similarly prohibit unusual punishments and the
conjunctive and disjunctive language of the state constitutions, before
demonstrating how the Eighth Amendment approach could translate to
the analysis of unusualness under state constitutional law. Part III then
examines the states that have unusual punishment proscriptions in their
state constitutions and categorizes the states based on the likelihood that
their use of the death penalty violates their state constitutions. Finally, in
Part IV, this Article argues for an expansive application of state
constitutions to bar unusual state capital punishments, exploring the
policy reasons supporting this analytical move.
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT UNUSUALNESS
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution proscribes “cruel and
unusual punishments.”27 Like much of the language of the Constitution,
this phrase is rather open-ended and does not readily contain a
particularized definition of what makes a punishment “unusual.”
Originalist scholar John Stinneford has argued that the meaning of
unusual is “contrary to long usage.”28 Further, he has claimed that the
framers intended the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to evolve over
time.29 As such, his reading of the proscription against unusual
punishments finds that the Eighth Amendment will evolve to bar
punishments that become infrequently used over time as society
matures.30
Two of the Supreme Court’s early Eighth Amendment cases support
the idea that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment evolves over time. In
Weems v. United States,31 the Court explained that conditions
surrounding a constitutional provision often change over time.32 Thus,
according to the Weems Court, “a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly
true of constitutions.”33
Building on this idea, the Court in Trop v. Dulles34 cemented the idea
that the Eighth Amendment changes over time.35 Specifically, the Court
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
28. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a
Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1767 (2008).
29. See id. at 1815–16 (explaining inherent flaws in the evolving-standards-of-decency
test).
30. Id. at 1746.
31. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
32. Id. at 373.
33. Id.
34. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
35. Id. at 100–01.
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explained that “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”36
As a result, it is without controversy that the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment will evolve over time.37 For the purposes of this Article, this
means that one can evaluate state constitutional practices developed
under Eighth Amendment standards as a moving target worthy of
reexamination over time. In other words, certain punishment practices
may, at some point, become cruel or unusual in light of the evolving
standards of society or the evolving punishment practices of a state.
A. Furman v. Georgia
The Supreme Court did not really develop the idea of unusualness
until its decision in Furman. In Furman, the Court held, in a short per
curiam opinion, that the death penalty, as applied, constituted a cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.38
One reason why the Furman Court found the death penalty violated
the Eighth Amendment related to the rarity with which states were using
it.39 For instance, Justice Douglas explained that unusual punishments
were ones “arbitrarily or discriminatorily” imposed and extreme rarity of
usage created a strong inference of arbitrariness.40 Justice Brennan
similarly added that where a punishment is “‘something different from
that which is generally done’ in such cases there is a substantial likelihood
that the State . . . is inflicting the punishment arbitrarily.”41 Justice
Stewart also emphasized the relationship between rare usage and
unusualness: “[I]t is equally clear that these sentences are ‘unusual’ in the
sense that the penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder, and
that its imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare.”42 He continued,
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For,
of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and
1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are
36. Id. at 101.
37. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002).
38. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
39. See generally id. (holding the death penalty to be a cruel and unusual punishment as
applied in three consolidated cases).
40. Id. at 249, 256 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M.
Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1790 (1970)).
41. Id. at 276–77 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 n.32 (1958)).
42. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1

8

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom
the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.43
Beyond arbitrariness, Justice White’s concurring opinion linked the
infrequency of use to the failure of satisfying the purposes of punishment
of retribution and deterrence.44 He explained, “I cannot avoid the
conclusion that as the statutes before us are now administered, the penalty
is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to
be of substantial service to criminal justice.”45
B. The Evolving Standards of Decency
In the aftermath of Furman and in light of its language in Trop v.
Dulles, the Supreme Court developed its evolving-standards-of-decency
jurisprudence by which it assesses the constitutionality of particular
punishments under the Eighth Amendment.46 This approach involves a
two-step analytical framework.47 The first step seeks to ascertain the
current societal standard of decency by examining the practices of state
legislatures with respect to the punishment at issue.48 In doing so, the
Court counts the states that use the punishment to determine its current
usage—that is, whether it is unusual.49 Rarely used punishments satisfy
this initial step.50 A second step allows the Court to “br[ing] to bear” its
own judgment, which typically consists of whether the Court finds that
one or more of the purposes of punishment justify the punishment at
issue.51 One can frame this second part of the inquiry as an assessment of
whether the punishment is cruel, in the sense that it is excessive and not
justified by some legitimate purpose.
Ultimately, the idea behind the first part of the evolving-standards-ofdecency test is to identify punishments that are, or have become, outliers.
Once a significant portion of society has abandoned a particular
punishment, it becomes unusual. Majoritarian in nature, this
conceptualization of unusualness serves the important purpose of
43. Id. at 309–10 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 313.
46. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
47. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
48. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421; Roper, 543 U.S. at 563; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
49. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 423; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65; Atkins, 536 U.S. at
314–15.
50. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426; Roper, 543 U.S. at 567; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–
16.
51. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597–98.
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eliminating the ability of certain jurisdictions to continue to engage in
punishment practices that society writ large has rejected and replaced.
Given that the first step of the evolving-standards-of-decency test
provides the basis for the state constitutional law application advocated
for below, it is instructive to examine how the Court has used the test in
particular cases to find the practice in question to be unusual. Generally,
the Court has relied on the practices of state legislatures to establish the
objective indicia of the evolving-standards-of-decency test,52 but it has
also looked to jury sentencing decisions,53 the direction of change,54 and
international norms.55
In Coker v. Georgia,56 the Court first looked to the practices of state
legislatures to assess the constitutionality of a punishment—in that case,
the death penalty as a punishment for rape.57 Prior to Furman, sixteen
states permitted death as a punishment for rape,58 but at the time of Coker,
Georgia was the only state that made the rape of a woman a capital
offense.59 The evidence of the practices of state legislatures clearly
indicated that the practice in question was unusual.60
The Court in Coker also examined jury sentencing decisions and
found that Georgia had, since the reinstatement of the death penalty,
sentenced five rapists to death out of sixty-three cases.61 Georgia juries
thus imposed a capital sentence for rape in less than 10% of such cases.62
The combination of the Court’s finding the death penalty an unusual
punishment for rape in Georgia—in light of the survey of state
legislatures and the sentencing decisions of Georgia juries—and the
Court’s view that the death penalty was a disproportionate and cruel
punishment for rape resulted in the Court holding that Georgia’s statute
violated the Eighth Amendment.63
52. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421; Roper, 543 U.S. at 563; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312;
Coker, 433 U.S. at 593–94.
53. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 596.
54. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66.
55. See, e.g., id. at 575.
56. 433 U.S. 584 (1976).
57. Id. at 594–96.
58. Id. at 593.
59. Id. at 595–96. As the Court noted, Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee authorized the
death penalty for child rape at the time of Coker. Id. at 595.
60. Id. at 592 n.4.
61. Id. at 596–97 (noting that a jury sentenced six of the defendants to death, but one was
set aside).
62. Id.
63. Id. The Court in Coker did not explicitly consider the purposes of punishment as it did
in later evolving-standards-of-decency cases, but the concept of proportionality implicitly refers
to such aims, as I have explained previously. See William W. Berry III, Promulgating
Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69, 93 (2011).
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In Enmund v. Florida,64 the Court applied the same majoritarian
evolving-standards-of-decency analysis as in Coker.65 Enmund
concerned the use of the death penalty for a felony murder conviction
where the crime was robbery and another committed the killing.66 Of the
thirty-six jurisdictions that permitted the death penalty at the time, the
Court noted that only eight authorized the death penalty for accomplices
in felony murder robbery cases like Enmund without proof of additional
aggravating circumstances.67 In addition, another nine states allowed
death sentences for felony murder accomplices where other aggravating
factors were present.68 The Court found that the legislative practice
“weigh[ed] on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at
issue.”69 The Court also considered jury sentences, although that was a
difficult proposition given the variety in felony murder cases and state
felony murder laws.70
After finding the punishment unusual under the objective indicia, the
Court in Enmund assessed whether the death sentence was appropriate in
light of the purposes of punishment.71 The Court concluded that Earl
Enmund’s sentence constituted a cruel and unusual punishment—the
crime of felony murder, as applied in his case, was unconstitutional.72
The Court narrowed the scope of Enmund five years later in Tison v.
Arizona,73 where it reconsidered the Eighth Amendment limitations on
felony murder in capital cases, again developing the scope of
unusualness.74 Tison involved the prosecution of Ricky and Raymond
Tison, both the sons of Gary Tison, who brutally murdered a family after
carjacking their car.75 The sons participated both in helping Tison break
out of prison and in the carjacking.76 They were not directly present,

64. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
65. Id. at 788–89.
66. Id. at 783–87.
67. Id. at 789.
68. Id. at 791.
69. Id. at 793.
70. Id. at 794–95.
71. Id. at 797–801.
72. Id. at 800–01.
73. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
74. Id. at 152–58.
75. Id. at 139–41. See generally JAMES W. CLARKE, LAST RAMPAGE: THE ESCAPE OF GARY
TISON (1988) (providing a chilling account of Tison’s escape from prison and subsequent crime
spree).
76. Tison, 481 U.S. at 139–40.
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however, when their father killed the family, and were unaware that he
intended to do so.77
The Court in Tison applied the same counting of state legislatures as
in Enmund but combined the jurisdictions that allowed felony murder for
any accomplice with those that only allowed felony murder with
additional aggravating circumstances.78 The Court reasoned that, unlike
Enmund, the Tison sons played an active role in the crime (particularly
the prison escape), and as a result both categories of jurisdictions should
count, leading to a finding that only eleven jurisdictions did not allow
death sentences in felony murder cases like Tison.79
The Court, under its subjective analysis, likewise found that the death
sentences imposed on the Tison sons were not disproportionate.80
Specifically, the Court cited the reckless endangerment of the Tison sons
as providing a level of intent that made a death sentence appropriate even
though the sons did not participate in the killing itself.81 The distinction,
then, between the outcomes in Enmund and Tison was the intent of the
felony murder accomplices.82 Unlike in Enmund and Coker, the Court
made clear that the majority of state legislatures did not provide a
consensus view in favor of eliminating the application of the punishment
at issue, meaning that the punishment was not unusual under the
circumstances.83
For fifteen years after Enmund, the Court did not apply the evolvingstandards-of-decency doctrine or the Eighth Amendment to a substantive
punishment. Then, in 2002, the Court began applying the doctrine to a
series of cases, deciding six cases over the next twelve years.
In Atkins v. Virginia,84 the Court held that the evolving standards of
decency and the Eighth Amendment prohibited death sentences for
intellectually disabled offenders.85 The Court again applied the
77. See id. at 139–41. Tison died of exposure in the desert after a police manhunt. Id. at
141. His death may have increased the public desire (or at least that of the prosecutor) to seek
death sentences for his sons. See generally CLARKE, supra note 75.
78. Tison, 481 U.S. at 152–55.
79. Id. at 152–55. The Court focused on the recklessness demonstrated by the sons in
breaking Tison out of prison, particularly considering their knowledge of his dangerous character
and criminal past. See id. at 151–52.
80. Id. at 155–58.
81. Id. at 157–58.
82. Id. For an argument that a recklessness mens rea should be required for capital
punishment for felony murder, see Guyora Binder et al., Capital Punishment of Unintentional
Felony Murder, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141, 1149–52 (2017), which argued for a mens rea
standard of recklessness in capital felony murder cases.
83. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 157–58.
84. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
85. Id. at 321.
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majoritarian objective indicia, focusing on state legislative practices that
permitted such sentences.86 The Court found that thirty states, including
twelve states that prohibited capital punishment, proscribed the execution
of intellectually disabled offenders, making it an unusual punishment.87
Further, the Court emphasized that “[i]t is not so much the number of
these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change[,]”88 noting that seventeen of the states that banned the execution
of intellectually disabled offenders had done so in the decade since the
Court’s prior decision on this issue in Penry v. Lynaugh.89 Finally, the
Court gave weight to the absence of new state legislation authorizing
executions of intellectually disabled offenders, as well as the small
number of executions (five inmates) after Penry.90
With respect to the subjective indicia, the Court in Atkins determined
that none of the purposes of punishment justified the execution of
intellectually disabled offenders.91 The purpose of retribution did not
justify execution of intellectually disabled offenders, according to the
Court, because such offenders by definition did not possess the required
culpability.92 The Court similarly found that exempting the intellectually
disabled from the death penalty would have no effect on the ability of the
death penalty to deter criminal offenders.93

86. Id. at 313–17.
87. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313).
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Atkins took issue with the counting method, instead claiming that
eighteen out of thirty-eight death penalty states (47%) banning such executions was not enough
to establish a national consensus. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315. Interestingly, the Court also cited three other states that
currently had bills pending that would ban the execution of intellectually disabled offenders. Id.
at 315 n.17.
89. Id. at 314–15; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins,
536 U.S. 304. The Court had reached the opposite conclusion in Penry but reversed that decision
in Atkins based in part on the legislative shift that demonstrated national consensus. Atkins, 536
U.S. at 314–16.
90. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
91. Id. at 318–20.
92. Id. at 319.
93. Id. at 319–20. The Court also focused on the likelihood of error as a reason for
abolishing the execution of intellectually disabled offenders. Id. at 320 n.25. The likelihood of
false confessions and the offender’s inability to aid the lawyer in his defense rested at the heart of
this concern. Id. Interestingly, the Court in Atkins did not address the broader question of whether
the holding applied to mental illness as well as mental retardation. And it failed to even define
mental retardation, leaving that determination up to individual states. Id. at 317. For an exploration
of possible applications of Atkins to mentally ill offenders through the intersection of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, see generally Nita A. Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishment,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 859 (2009).
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Three years later, the Court applied similar reasoning in Roper v.
Simmons,94 holding that the evolving standards of decency and the Eighth
Amendment prohibited death sentences for juvenile offenders.95 As in
Atkins, the application of the unusualness objective indicia commenced
with counting the state laws, and like Atkins, thirty states had prohibited
the execution of juvenile offenders (twelve of which had banned the death
penalty altogether).96 Also like Atkins, the Court in Roper assessed
whether the evolving standards of decency provided enough evidence of
changed circumstances to reverse a prior decision—its decision in
Stanford v. Kentucky97 sixteen years earlier.98
The Court also noted the presence of objective evidence moving
toward ending juvenile executions, although only five states (as
compared to sixteen in Atkins) had abandoned the juvenile death penalty
since Stanford.99 Also, as in Atkins, no state had reinstated the juvenile
death penalty since Stanford.100
With respect to the subjective standards, the Court developed the idea
that juveniles were offenders that, by definition, possessed a diminished
level of culpability.101 Specifically, the Court cited (1) the lack of
maturity and undeveloped sense of responsibility of juveniles; (2) the
susceptibility of juveniles to outside pressures and negative influences;
and (3) the unformed nature of juveniles’ character as compared to
adults.102
In light of the diminished level of culpability, the purposes of
punishment, in the Court’s view, failed to justify the imposition of
juvenile death sentences.103 Such death sentences failed to achieve the
purpose of retribution in light of the diminished culpability.104 Likewise,
the Court concluded that the execution of juveniles did not achieve a
deterrent effect because offenders with diminished capacity are unlikely
to be susceptible to deterrence.105 In addition, the Court found no

94. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
95. Id. at 578–79.
96. Id. at 564–65.
97. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
98. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65. Stanford held that the execution of seventeen-year-old
offenders did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
99. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. Even though the change in Roper was less pronounced than in
Atkins, the Court still emphasized that it found it “significant.” Id.
100. Id. at 566.
101. Id. at 569–70.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 570–71.
104. Id. at 571.
105. Id. at 571–72.
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evidence that a juvenile death sentence would add any deterrent value
beyond that achieved by a life-without-parole sentence.106
One other important aspect of the decision in Roper bears mentioning.
At the end of its analysis, the Court also cited to the relevance of
international standards and practices in determining the meaning of the
evolving standards.107 In particular, the Court emphasized that the United
States was the only country in the world that permitted the juvenile death
penalty.108 Again, the focus on unusualness in judicial review partially
explains the Court’s decision to strike down the statute—the broad
consensus, at home and abroad—justified the Court’s action and captured
the political shift since its prior decision in Stanford.109
Three years later, the Court expanded its holding from Coker in
Kennedy v. Louisiana,110 striking down Louisiana’s child rape statute
under the Eighth Amendment.111 Specifically, the Court held that the
evolving standards of decency foreclosed the imposition of a death
sentence for child rape.112
In applying the unusualness objective indicia, the Court determined
that forty-four states did not allow capital punishment for child rape.113
As this number exceeded the number of states in Atkins (thirty), Roper
(thirty), and Enmund (forty-two), the Court concluded that the objective
consensus banned the death penalty for child rape.114 In other words, the
Court found that the death penalty for child rape was an unusual
punishment.115
With respect to the subjective indicia, the Kennedy Court explained
that retribution did not justify a penalty of death for a child rape because,
as indicated in Coker, such a penalty was disproportionate.116 With
respect to deterrence, the Court concluded that the crime of child rape is
underreported and allowing the death penalty as a punishment would only
106. Id.
107. Id. at 575–78; see David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49
UCLA L. REV. 539, 589 (2001).
108. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
109. Id.
110. 554 U.S. 407, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
111. Id. at 421.
112. Id. at 447.
113. Id. at 423.
114. Id. at 426. Interestingly, the Court discounted the direction of change, as six states had
adopted statutes allowing the death penalty for child rape in the five years prior to Kennedy. Id.
at 431. The Court dismissed this change as insignificant when compared to Atkins and Roper. Id.
Another implicit reason for the Court’s view here might be the idea that the evolving standards of
decency only evolve in one direction—away from severe punishments. See Stinneford, supra note
28, at 1816.
115. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435.
116. Id. at 442.
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increase the incentive to hide the crime.117 As such, death for child rape
would likely not advance the purpose of deterrence.118
What these cases show, among other things, is the scope of the Court’s
finding of unusualness by state counting. The punishments were unusual
when one (Coker), six (Kennedy), eight (Enmund), or twenty (Atkins and
Roper) states allowed the punishment but not unusual where thirty-eight
(Tison) allowed the punishment. It is worth noting that in Atkins and
Roper, the Court found a punishment to be unusual when 40% of
jurisdictions used the punishment, albeit with some additional factors—
direction of change and international consensus—supporting the
conclusion that a punishment was an outlier. In other words, any state
punishment used in less than 40% of counties arguably might be an
unusual punishment.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL UNUSUALNESS
The U.S. Constitution, as discussed above, proscribes “cruel and
unusual punishments.”119 Many state constitutions contain similar
language or, at the very least, proscribe “unusual” punishments.120 As
explored below, while there is variation in the language of state
constitutions, almost all of the death penalty states include the word
“unusual” in their constitutions.121 This means that, with respect to capital
punishment, there exists a clear application of federal constitutional
principles to the regulation of the death penalty under state constitutional

117. Id. at 444.
118. Id. at 445.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
120. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12; ARIZ. CONST. art. II,
§ 15; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. I § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20; DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 11; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XVII; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 12;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 16; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 17; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights, § 9; KY. CONST. § 17; LA. CONST. art. I, § 20; ME. CONST. art. I, § 9; MD. CONST.
Declaration of Rights, art. XVI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 28; MO. CONST. art. I, § 21; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22;
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 6; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XXXIII; N.J. CONST. art.
I, ¶ 12; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27; N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § II-9; OR. CONST. art. I, § 16; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 13; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9; VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5;
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 6; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
121. The exceptions to this are Connecticut (CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8), Illinois (ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 11), and Vermont (VT. CONST. ch. II, § 39).
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law.122 It is important, though, to distinguish such an approach from using
an identical test to the Eighth Amendment.
For instance, on the federal level, the objective test for the evolving
standards of decency examines the practices of state legislatures to assess
the interstate consensus with respect to a particular punishment practice.
One approach a state could use is to assume that punishments that satisfy
the national consensus (and thus meet the federal constitutional standard)
are sufficient under the state constitution.
The assumption, though, that the content of the state and federal
constitutions are identical is unnecessary and certainly contrary to the
language of state constitutions in many cases.123 Instead, state courts
should use the principles inherent in the Eighth Amendment as the basis
for developing a test for constitutionality under their state constitutions.
Thus, an evolving-standards-of-decency test under a state constitution
would examine the intrastate consensus to determine whether a particular
punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, not simply assume that the
result would be the same under the state constitution as under the Eighth
Amendment.
A. State Constitutional Analogues to the Eighth Amendment
Twenty-six out of the twenty-nine states that still retain the death
penalty have constitutional provisions that proscribe “unusual”
punishments.124 While there is some variation, most states bar cruel and
unusual punishments, cruel or unusual punishments, or combine this type
of provision with some additional guiding principles.125
The similarity in language of these provisions to the Eighth
Amendment suggests, at the very least, some potential conceptual overlap
between the Eighth Amendment and state constitutions. In the capital
context, this means assessing cases in light of the principles articulated in
Furman, as well as the evolving-standards-of-decency doctrine.126 When
punishments are rare, as an intrastate matter, they can be unusual under
state constitutions, just as rare punishments under the Eighth Amendment

122. Indeed, many states use an approach identical to the Eighth Amendment or,
alternatively, use principles from the Eighth Amendment to define the scope of their state
constitutions. See Berry, supra note 23 (manuscript at 14).
123. Some states, for instance, proscribe “cruel or unusual” punishments instead of “cruel
and unusual” punishments. See id. at 13–14, 27.
124. See sources cited supra notes 120–21.
125. See; Stinneford, supra note 28, at 1799. See generally Berry, supra note 23 (discussing
the various approaches).
126. See discussion supra Part I.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss1/1

16

Berry: Unusual State Capital Punishments

2020]

UNUSUAL STATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS

17

can fail to satisfy the objective indicia of the evolving-standards-ofdecency test.127
It is also worth noting, just as under the Eighth Amendment,
punishments under state constitutions can be unconstitutional in two
senses—as categorical proscriptions that arise under a constitution or in
the form of as-applied violations. Most of the Court’s applications of the
Eighth Amendment have served to exclude the death penalty
categorically in certain situations—when the crime is rape128 or child
rape129 or when the offender is intellectually disabled130 or a juvenile.131
But the Court has also held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied
in Furman132 and as applied to felony murders in certain circumstances
in Enmund.133
The same can be true under state constitutions. Certain manifestations
of the death penalty might be unusual under state constitutions
categorically, similar to those limitations arising under the Eighth
Amendment. A state, for instance, could require a minimum mens rea in
a felony murder case to make a capital sentence constitutional.134
A state could also find the death penalty, as applied intrastate, to be
unconstitutional for the same reasons that the Court found it
unconstitutional in Furman.135 In other words, state courts could
determine that a particular application of a punishment is unconstitutional
without creating a categorical proscription for the punishment.136

127. See Stinneford, supra note 28, at 1823.
128. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
129. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
130. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708
(2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
131. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
132. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
133. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
134. Felony murder cases do not require any proof of an intent to kill, but a state could require
some level of criminal intent under the state constitution in such cases as a minimum threshold
for capital sentences. See Binder et al., supra note 82, at 1152, 1199; see also William W. Berry
III, Rethinking Capital Felony Murder, JOTWELL (Feb. 12, 2018), https://crim.jotwell.com/
rethinking-capital-felony-murder/ [https://perma.cc/FE6K-CYE8] (reviewing Guyora Binder et al.,
supra note 82, at 1141).
135. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding the
imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to that case for reasons described in
various concurring opinions).
136. As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court found that the death penalty as applied to a
felony murder in Enmund violated the Eighth Amendment, 458 U.S. at 788, but was constitutional
as applied to a felony murder in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
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B. Conjunctives and Disjunctives
While some states read their state constitutional analogues to the
Eighth Amendment as being identical in scope to the Eighth
Amendment,137 this is a choice of the state courts, not a mandatory,
required reading. As this Section explains, this is true irrespective of
whether the state constitutional language is identical to the Eighth
Amendment or contains linguistic differences that give rise to unique
readings of the state constitution.
One category of difference between some state constitutional
analogues and the text of the Eighth Amendment relates to the disjunctive
nature of the state provisions. Sixteen states have disjunctive state
constitutional analogues to the Eighth Amendment, meaning that their
constitutions proscribe “cruel or unusual” punishments instead of “cruel
and unusual” punishments.138 On its face, this means that state courts, at
least in capital cases, can split the evolving-standards-of-decency inquiry.
If “or” really means “or,” then the state constitution bars a punishment
that meets one of the parameters of cruelty and unusualness. A cruel
punishment violates the state constitution irrespective of whether it is also
unusual; an unusual punishment violates the state constitution
irrespective of whether it is also cruel. A punishment that fails either the
objective jurisdiction-counting test or fails to satisfy one of the purposes
of punishment would be unconstitutional under the state constitution.
Within the context of this Article, then, capital punishments imposed by
state legislatures and courts that are unusual are unconstitutional if arising
in states with disjunctive constitutional language.
Other state constitutions have linguistic differences that make separate
consideration of unusualness without the need for a showing of cruelty
unlikely. For instance, several states proscribe cruel punishments, but not
unusual ones.139 It would be difficult to read these provisions as
proscribing punishments that are merely unusual, unless the state courts
read such a requirement into the provisions. The state courts of
Connecticut, for example, read in an entire proscription against cruel and
unusual punishments even though there is no explicit language to that
137. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 23 (manuscript at 14–23).
138. The states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 9; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 17; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 9; MASS. CONST. pt. 1,
art. XXVI; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 28; NEV.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § II-9;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14.
139. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. I, § 11; KY. CONST. § 17; PA. CONST. art. I, § 13; R.I. CONST.
art. I, § 8; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 23; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14.
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effect in its constitution.140 It is possible that state courts could do this
with respect to unusual punishment, but unlikely states would read
unusual in as a separate requirement.141
Even where states use identical or almost identical language to the
Eighth Amendment, state constitutions can give rise to different
interpretations of the same language. This is because the conjunction
“and” in cruel and unusual is ambiguous—it gives rise to multiple
possible readings.
First, “and” can be conjunctive, meaning “and.” This reading would
proscribe punishments that are both cruel and unusual. Scholars have
most commonly read the Eighth Amendment in this way.142 Under this
reading, it is unlikely that unusual state punishments would be
unconstitutional under a state constitution unless they were also cruel.
A second reading of the conjunction “and” is disjunctive, meaning
“or.” This reading would proscribe both punishments that are cruel and
punishments that are unusual. Although a plausible reading, the general
consensus is that such a reading may be in tension with the more natural
conjunctive reading of the text.143 Under this reading, unusual
punishments would violate a state constitution without needing to be
cruel as well.
A third reading of “cruel and unusual” could be as a singular, unitary
concept that interlocks the two words. Under this approach, “cruel and

140. See CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 9.
141. Indeed, the states that omit “unusual” typically apply the Eighth Amendment tests in
their cases. See Berry, supra note 23 (manuscript at 36–38).
142. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
14 (1980); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 116 (2012); Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1777–
79 (2011); Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, and the Eighth
Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149, 1200 (2006); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 120 (1997); Ronald Dworkin, The
Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249,
1253 (1997); David B. Hershenov, Why Must Punishment Be Unusual as Well as Cruel to Be
Unconstitutional?, 16 PUB. AFF. Q. 77, 77 (2002); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When the
Federal Death Penalty Is “Cruel and Unusual,” 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 831–32 (2006); Meghan
J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments that Are
Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 569 (2010).
143. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 376 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (per
curiam) (“Although the Eighth Amendment literally reads as prohibiting only those punishments
that are both ‘cruel’ and ‘unusual’. . . .”); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the
Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 883 n.3 (2009) (“The conjunction ‘and’ in ‘cruel and
unusual’ notwithstanding . . . .”); Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 491 (2005) (“The Justices sometimes have said that an unconstitutional
punishment must be both cruel and unusual, just as the literal text provides.”).
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unusual” comprises a single, inseparable idea.144 In other words, there is
something in the nature of cruel punishments that is unusual and
something in the nature of unusual punishments that is cruel.145 Under
this reading, an unusual punishment would need to also satisfy the other
prong of the evolving-standards-of-decency test to be unconstitutional
under state constitutions. This is because the unitary nature of the concept
must include some conception of disproportionality.
A fourth reading of “cruel and usual” could be as a tautology. This
would mean that cruel and unusual are essentially synonyms or two ways
of saying the same thing.146 Thus, cruel punishments are unusual
punishments and unusual punishments are cruel punishments.147 In this
case, unusual punishments would violate a state constitution without
additional proof of cruelty because the unusualness would be enough to
demonstrate cruelty.
Finally, one can read “cruel and unusual” as a hendiadys, meaning
that the second term essentially modifies the first.148 Under this
interpretive approach, cruel and unusual means “unusually cruel.”149
Such an approach could potentially serve as the basis for as-applied
challenges to punishments that are unusual but not necessarily
disproportionate. The Court’s decision in Furman provides an applicable
example.150 The idea concerns the cruelty of the death penalty, which
becomes a cruel punishment when it is executed in an unusual manner.
The unusualness—described in terms of arbitrariness by the Court—is
what makes the death penalty “unusually cruel” as applied.151
C. Counties as Analogues for States
If state courts hope to give their state constitutions their own
independent meanings, state courts must read the provisions of their state
144. See, e.g., HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW,
POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 96 (1987); KENT GREENAWALT, INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION 119 (2015); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 519, 545 n.120 (2003); John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 968–69 (2011).
145. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 144.
146. JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE
FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 180–81 (2012).
147. Id.
148. Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys in
the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 695, 712 (2016).
149. Id. at 690.
150. See discussion supra Section I.A. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (per curiam) (finding that the death sentence in that case was cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
151. See discussion supra Section I.A. See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (discussing the
likelihood that the death penalty is being arbitrarily given).
AND
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constitutions as doing more than simply identically importing the national
constitutional analysis of the Eighth Amendment. This intellectually lazy
approach simply equates the meaning of a state constitution to the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, such that the analysis is identical and
there is no distinction or intellectual space between a state constitution
and the federal constitution. If a state constitution contains no distinct
meaning from the federal constitution, it is essentially a dead letter. Under
such an approach, erasing the language from a state constitution would
be inconsequential. This is because the Eighth Amendment would still
provide the same protections or, in many cases, be devoid of protections
for criminal defendants.
State constitutional provisions, where possible, should have their own
separate meanings from their federal constitutional counterparts. Where
states use analogues to the federal constitution, as in the context of the
Eighth Amendment, one possibility for states is to apply the federal rule
on the state level. The evolving-standards-of-decency doctrine offers the
ability to make this kind of intellectual move.
As explained above, the evolving-standards-of-decency test requires
the Court to assess the practices of state legislatures and juries with
respect to a particular punishment practice. This application of “objective
indicia” surveys states to assess whether the practice in question is a
common one or an unusual one.
When a state court is determining whether a punishment is unusual
under its state constitution, it does not make sense to assess the national
consensus. The acceptability of a punishment practice in one state, in the
initial analysis, should not depend on what another state is doing, at least
with respect to the meaning of the state constitution.152 Looking to other
states in the context of the meaning of a state constitution is similar to the
Supreme Court looking to punishment practices of other countries in
determining the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. While the inquiry
may be relevant to the question, it provides support to the primary
inquiry, as opposed to being the sole inquiry.153
Instead, a state court should initially look to the practices of counties
within the state to assess whether a punishment is unusual under the state
constitution. In capital cases, juries make sentencing decisions within a
particular county based on the decision of the county to seek the death
penalty in the initial instance. Whether capital punishment is unusual
under a state constitution relates to an intrastate analysis of punishment
practices. While the Supreme Court engages in state counting to
determine the constitutionality of a punishment under the Eighth

152. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
153. Id. at 575–78; see Fontana, supra note 107, at 546.
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Amendment, state courts should similarly engage in county counting to
determine the constitutionality of a punishment under state constitutions.
Rather than simply copying the analysis of the Supreme Court, this
approach adapts the federal process to the state. It stays true to the
evolving-standards-of-decency test and the cruel/unusual punishment
language but adapts the inquiry to one that is within the state instead of
within the entire country. Here, state courts are interpreting the meaning
of their state constitutions, not the federal constitution.
The county counting approach could take several forms. The most
obvious way to conduct this inquiry is to count the total number of
counties and the number of counties that have used the death penalty
since 1976. If the total number of counties using the death penalty
amounts to 40% or less, the use of the death penalty would in theory be
unusual.
To be sure, state courts could adopt a shorter time span, but dating
back to the 1976 reinstatement of the death penalty in Gregg allows for
full assessment of counties where aggravated murders have occurred less
often. If there have been no capital cases in over a forty-year period, it
does not seem difficult to conclude that the county is not using the death
penalty. As the standards of decency evolve over time, choosing a sample
from the last ten years or even the last five years may also be appropriate.
With respect to the 40% threshold, this number parallels the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Atkins and Roper. In those cases, thirty of fifty states
barred a particular practice, which made it unusual under the objective
test of the evolving standards of decency. At the very least, a practice
used by 16% of counties or less—the percentage for the as-applied
inquiry in Enmund—would constitute an unusual punishment.
A more circumscribed version of this approach could require a
minimum number of capital sentences to qualify a county as a “death
penalty county” for county counting purposes. A county with less than
five death sentences since 1976 could easily qualify as a non-death
county under such an approach.
Irrespective of how a court chooses to draw these lines, creating an
intrastate, county-by-county assessment approach is necessary to
determine whether capital sentences are unusual within a state and
therefore at least partially in contravention of the state constitution.
It is also important to note the difference between a categorical and an
as-applied challenge in this context. If certain counties have banned the
death penalty, even by policy of the district attorney, then the inquiry
would have a categorical focus—as with the Supreme Court decisions in
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Coker,154 Atkins,155 Roper,156 and Kennedy.157 By contrast, if the focus is
simply whether particular counties are using the death penalty, then the
question is an as-applied one like in Furman158 and Enmund.159
Within as-applied challenges, an examination of the intrastate
practices by county directly mirrors the Court’s analysis in Furman.160
Exploring state capital sentencing practices can reveal whether and when
death sentences are rare, arbitrary, or even random. Though beyond the
scope of this Article, capital sentencing disparities based on race,
geography, and unguided discretion create constitutional problems and
raise questions as to the legitimacy of capital punishment.161 What the
proposed approach does is offer a window into the collective unusualness
of capital sentencing practices in states as a means to remedy the broader
problems.
Such a state constitutional approach becomes particularly important
in light of the Supreme Court’s mantra that “death is different.”162 As a
punishment, the death penalty is unique both in its severity and
irrevocability.163 As such, unusualness that might be tolerable with lesser
punishments—such as the arbitrariness of regulating speeding on
highways—is not tolerable when death is the punishment.

154. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (discussing whether the death penalty
is categorically appropriate in cases of rape).
155. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002) (discussing whether the death penalty
is categorically appropriate where the defendant is “mentally retarded”).
156. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 555–56 (discussing whether the death penalty is categorically
appropriate where the defendant is a minor).
157. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (discussing whether the death penalty is
categorically appropriate in cases involving rape of a child), modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
158. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (per curiam) (discussing whether the
death penalty was appropriate under the circumstances of each of three consolidated cases).
159. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 826 (1982).
160. See discussion supra Section I.A; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 298 nn.52–53 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (examining states that abolished death as a punishment or stopped using it).
161. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2762, 2764, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
162. Justice Brennan’s concurrence in this case is apparently the origin of the Court’s deathis-different capital jurisprudence. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 286 (“Death is a unique punishment
in the United States.”); see also Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role
of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 118 (2004) (discussing the Court’s death-isdifferent jurisprudence and requesting additional procedural safeguards “when humans play at
God”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370 (1995)
(crediting Justice Brennan as the originator of this line of argument).
163. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) (stating that the penalty of death
is “qualitatively” and “profoundly different” from other penalties); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 287 (1976) (distinguishing the penalty of death as “unique and irreversible”).
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III. UNUSUAL STATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS
Applying the theoretical frame described in Part II, it quickly becomes
clear that state capital punishment practices fall into different categories
in light of their use of the death penalty.164 For ease of analysis, this
Article divides the twenty-nine capital states into three broad
categories—“de facto abolition” states, “evolved standards” states, and
“status quo” states.
De facto abolition states are states that technically permit the death
penalty but have rarely sentenced individuals to death or executed
criminal offenders. As a practical matter, these states do not use the death
penalty, even though it is still a valid punishment under state law. In the
de facto abolition states, the death penalty is clearly unusual, as the state
never, or almost never, uses it. Given that a death sentence or execution
is a remote possibility in such states, the death penalty would clearly be
unusual under a state constitution.
The second category, the evolved standards states, includes states in
which the overwhelming majority of the counties in the state do not
sentence offenders to death or rarely do so. In these states, the
majoritarian consensus is not to use the death penalty, thus making it an
unusual punishment. The analysis here tracks the Supreme Court’s
objective indicia in its evolving-standards-of-decency inquiry but
engages an intrastate analysis of counties instead of an interstate analysis
of states.
The third category, the status quo states, includes states in which the
death penalty remains widely used in terms of both new death sentences
and executions. These states might one day evolve their standards such
that the death penalty becomes rare but have not yet reached that point.
A. De Facto Abolition States
1. The States (California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Utah, and Wyoming)
a. California
California has executed thirteen offenders since 1976, from eleven of
its fifty-eight counties (19%).165 At the same time, California houses the
164. The numbers that provide the basis for this analysis date from April 1, 2019.
165. See DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A.:
SPRING 2019, at 8 (2019); California Counties by Population, CAL. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6,
2018), https://www.california-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/
B7K4-EXKG]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/clustering-death-penalty#DR [https://perma.cc/A9CV-Z8VE].
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largest death row in the United States, with approximately 740 inmates
from thirty-seven of its fifty-eight counties (64%).166 California has not
executed anyone since 2006,167 despite continuing to sentence offenders
to death in significant numbers (typically ten or more) annually.168 The
state shows no signs of pursuing an execution, particularly now that the
new governor has imposed an indefinite moratorium on the death
penalty.169 Even though the distribution of death sentences by county is
not unusual, the number of executions is, and as a result, California’s
death penalty is probably unusual with respect to its state constitution.
b. Colorado
Examining Colorado county by county, it is clear that the death
penalty is unusual as an intrastate matter because there is almost de facto
abolition. Colorado has only executed one individual since the
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976.170 In addition, Colorado only
has three individuals on its death row, all sentenced in Arapahoe
County.171 As a result, less than 2% of Colorado’s counties (one out of
sixty-four) have sentenced an individual to death, and only one county
has been responsible for an execution (one out of sixty-four).172
c. Idaho
Idaho has executed three offenders since 1976173 and has only eight
offenders on death row,174 indicating an almost de facto abolition. Of
166. See FINS, supra note 165, at 43; California Counties by Population, supra note 165;
The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; see also Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview?scid=9&amp;did=188 [https://perma.cc/
2KWG-LFJ4] (estimating that there are 732 inmates currently on death row in California).
167. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
168. See California, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/california-1
[https://perma.cc/9W8C-747F].
169. See Don Thompson, California’s New Governor Signs Moratorium on Executions, BOS.
GLOBE (Mar. 13, 2019, 6:36 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2019/03/13/
california-new-governor-signs-moratorium-executions/AANYgqLNjVBXlT4z6x0xUL/story.html
[http://perma.cc/2HDJ-HXKZ].
170. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9; see also Colorado, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/colorado [https://perma.cc/
8R8D-QT7V].
171. See FINS, supra note 165, at 49; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
172. See Colorado Counties, UNCOVER COLO., https://www.uncovercolorado.com/counties/
[https://perma.cc/37MT-B9TQ]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
173. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9; see also Idaho, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/idaho [https://perma.cc/9WWX
-PLHG].
174. See FINS, supra note 165, at 52; Death Row, IDAHO DEP’T CORRECTION,
https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/death_row [https://perma.cc/B644-Q6Y9].
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Idaho’s forty-four counties, two have been responsible for the three
executions (less than 5%).175 Similarly, only five counties have convicted
offenders currently on death row (11%), with Ada County responsible for
four of the eight (50%).176 Given the miniscule percentage of Idaho
counties engaged in capital punishment and in light of the overall
disinclination to sentence inmates to death or execute them, it seems clear
that the death penalty in Idaho is unusual as a matter of intrastate inquiry
under the state constitution.
d. Kansas
Kansas has not executed anyone since the reinstatement of the death
penalty in 1976.177 In addition, Kansas only has ten offenders on death
row, from eight different counties.178 In a state of 105 counties, this
means that less than 7% of the counties have sentenced an offender to
death.179 As a result, Kansas’s use of the death penalty is unusual as a
matter of intrastate county counting.
e. Kentucky
Kentucky has only executed three offenders since 1976 and has thirtyone inmates currently on its death row.180 Of Kentucky’s 120 counties,
only three are responsible for executions (2.5%) and only fourteen (12%)
have inmates on death row.181 The state has also not had an execution in
over a decade182 and has sentenced only three people to death in the past
decade.183 By all accounts, Kentucky’s use of the death penalty is unusual
on an intrastate county level.

175. See Idaho Counties, IDAHO.GOV, https://www.idaho.gov/counties/ [https://perma.cc/
GJK2-GPPD]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
176. The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
177. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8–9; see also Kansas, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/kansas [https://perma.cc/BZ2GG8L5].
178. See FINS, supra note 165, at 52; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
179. See Kansas Counties, KAN. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.kshs.org/p/kansascounties/11304 [https://perma.cc/3TV6-4W4A]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note
165.
180. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9, 52; see also Kentucky, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/kentucky [https://perma.cc/
DC8D-679B].
181. See Commonwealth of Kentucky, KY. ATLAS & GAZETTEER, https://www.kyatlas.
com/kentucky-counties.html [https://perma.cc/HPY9-DW23]; The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165.
182. See Kentucky, supra note 180.
183. Id.
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f. Montana
Montana’s lack of use of the death penalty suggests that it is another
de facto abolition state. The state has only executed three offenders since
the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976184 and currently has only
two offenders on death row.185 Of the fifty-six counties, three have been
responsible for an execution (5%) and two are responsible for a current
death row inmate (2%).186 Montana’s intrastate use of the death penalty
is clearly unusual.
g. Nebraska
Nebraska’s legislature abolished the death penalty in 2015, but its
citizens voted to reinstate it during a referendum in 2016.187 Even so,
Nebraska’s use of the death penalty since 1976 has been rare, with only
four executions188 and twelve inmates on death row.189 Only three of out
of the state’s ninety-three counties have been responsible for executions
(3%) and only six counties are responsible for the current inmates on
death row (6%).190 Given the small number of counties participating in
the death penalty, it is clear that, as an intrastate matter, Nebraska’s use
of the death penalty is unusual.

184. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9; see also Montana, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/montana [https://perma.cc/
5F45-EFVB].
185. See FINS, supra note 165, at 54; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
186. See Montana Counties by Population, MONT. DEMOGRAPHICS, https://www.montanademographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/HY4N-Q8U3]; The Clustering of
the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
187. Paul Hammel, Nebraskans Vote Overwhelmingly to Restore Death Penalty, Nullify
Historic 2015 Vote by State Legislature, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.omaha.com/news/politics/nebraskans-vote-overwhelmingly-to-restore-death-penaltynullify-historic-vote/article_38823d54-a5df-11e6-9a5e-d7a71d75611a.html [https://perma.cc/
PJ8T-QBJH].
188. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9; see also Nebraska, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/nebraska [https://perma.cc/
BZ4G-P3CA].
189. See FINS, supra note 165, at 54; Death Row, supra note 166; The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165.
190. See Nebraska Counties by Population, NEB. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.nebraska-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/9SSQBHXV]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
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h. Oregon
Oregon has conducted two executions since 1976 and has a current
death row population of thirty-two inmates.191 Of the state’s thirty-six
counties, two have executed an inmate (6%) and ten have sentenced an
inmate to death (31%) in the post-Gregg era.192 In the past decade,
Oregon has not executed any inmates and has only sentenced five people
to death.193 By any measure, Oregon’s use of the death penalty is unusual
on the county level.
i. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has only executed three inmates since 1976, all coming
from different counties, meaning that less than 4% (three out of sixtyseven) of Pennsylvania counties are responsible for an execution.194 Its
current death row contains around 150 inmates sentenced in thirty-six
different counties (54%).195 Philadelphia County (fifty-three) alone
accounts for around 35% of the death row population, and when it is
paired with Allegheny (nine) and York (twelve), the three counties
comprise just under half of the Pennsylvania death sentences.196 As with
California, there is a real disconnect in Pennsylvania between the high
death row population (around 150) and the low number of executions
(three).197
Pennsylvania has not executed anyone in twenty years and has
sentenced fifteen offenders from ten counties to death (15%) in the past
decade.198 The absence of executions makes Pennsylvania’s capital
191. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9, 58; see also Oregon, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/oregon [https://perma.cc/2P5YNSDP].
192. See Oregon Counties by Population, OR. DEMOGRAPHICS (May 2019),
https://www.oregon-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/V56A-FYF7];
The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
193. Oregon, supra note 191.
194. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9; see also Pennsylvania, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/pennsylvania [https://perma.cc/
NF7B-VHA9]; Pennsylvania Counties by Population, PA. DEMOGRAPHICS (May 2019),
https://www.pennsylvania-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/HDZ2RQCG]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
195. See FINS, supra note 165, at 58; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also PA. DEP’T OF CORR., PERSONS SENTENCED TO EXECUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA AS OF
AUGUST 1, 2019, at 6 (2019) (estimating that 139 inmates are currently on death row).
196. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; see also PA. DEP’T OF CORR.,
supra note 195 (estimating that forty-five inmates are currently on death row in Philadelphia
County).
197. FINS, supra note 165, at 9, 58; see also Pennsylvania, supra note 194.
198. See Pennsylvania, supra note 194; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
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sentencing unusual, and its decreasing percentage of counties sentencing
offenders to death in the past decade confirms this conclusion.
j. South Dakota
South Dakota has similarly used the death penalty in such a rare
manner as to constitute de facto abolition. It has only executed four
inmates since 1976, and currently has only three offenders on death
row.199 Of the sixty-six counties in South Dakota, only two (3%) have
been responsible for the execution of a criminal offender200 and two are
responsible for the offenders currently on death row (3%).201 South
Dakota’s use of the death penalty is clearly unusual as an intrastate
matter, with a small percentage of counties responsible for the rare cases
that receive a death sentence and result in an execution.
k. Utah
Utah has executed seven inmates since 1976, representing four of the
state’s twenty-nine counties (14%).202 Utah’s death row is sparse,
containing only eight offenders from seven counties (24%).203 Utah has
not executed anyone since 2010 and has not sentenced anyone to death
since 2008.204 Given Utah’s near de facto abolition of the death penalty
and rare use across its counties, its intrastate usage is unusual on the
county level.

199. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9, 60; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also South Dakota, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-andfederal-info/state-by-state/south-dakota [https://perma.cc/N5AV-9B92] (estimating that there are
three offenders on death row).
200. See South Dakota Counties by Population, S.D. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.southdakota-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/7KXG8FDC]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165. Minnehaha County is responsible
for two of the four executions conducted in South Dakota since 1977. See The Clustering of the
Death Penalty, supra note 165.
201. See South Dakota Counties by Population, supra note 200; The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165.
202. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
Utah Counties by Population, UTAH DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.utahdemographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/KCV5-APKC]; see also Utah,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-bystate/utah [https://perma.cc/466V-TSC] (stating that six executions have taken place in Utah since
1976).
203. See FINS, supra note 165, at 62; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
204. See Utah, supra note 202.
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l. Wyoming
Wyoming is another state that has de facto abolished the death
penalty, executing only one offender since 1976 and currently housing
only one offender on death row.205 Thus, of the twenty-three counties in
Wyoming, less than 5% (one out of twenty-three) have been responsible
for the execution of an offender since 1976 and the same number (less
than 5%) have actually sentenced an offender to death since 1976.206
Wyoming’s use of the death penalty is clearly unusual as a matter of
intrastate inquiry for state constitutional purposes.
2. Possible State Constitutional Consequences
Of the de facto abolition states, California,207 Kansas,208
Pennsylvania,209 and Wyoming210 have disjunctive constitutional
language that bars cruel “or” unusual punishments. Given the clear
evidence that the death penalty is unusual under the evolving-standardsof-decency test as applied in an intrastate fashion to their counties, the
California, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming state courts could
declare the death penalty unconstitutional, as applied, under the
California constitution, the Kansas constitution, the Pennsylvania
constitution, and the Wyoming constitution, respectively. The “or” in a
state constitution means that unusualness is enough; the death penalty, as
applied, violates the state constitution, irrespective of whether the state
courts find the death penalty to also be cruel.211
In Colorado,212 Idaho,213 and Utah,214 the state constitutions use
identical language to the Eighth Amendment, proscribing “cruel and
unusual” punishments. As indicated above, it is possible for those state
courts to interpret this language disjunctively or as a tautology, meaning
that proof of unusualness would be sufficient to demonstrate a state
constitutional violation.215 The more likely readings, though, are reading
205. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9, 62; Wyoming, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/wyoming [https://perma.cc/
HZX5-QKV8].
206. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; Wyoming, supra note 205;
Wyoming Counties by Population, WYO. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.wyomingdemographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/YLJ4-M86K].
207. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
208. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 9.
209. PA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
210. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14.
211. See discussion supra Section II.B.
212. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20.
213. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6.
214. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9.
215. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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cruel and unusual as interconnected requirements or as separate
requirements. In the first case, the unusualness would have a bearing on
whether the punishment is also cruel.216 As in Furman, the rare nature of
the punishment connotes arbitrariness.217 Arbitrary punishments can be
cruel.218
Alternatively, those courts could read cruelty as a separate
requirement. As under the evolving-standards-of-decency subjective test,
this analysis would relate to whether the death penalty is a proportional
punishment, as applied, or whether it satisfies one or more purposes of
punishment.219 The proportionality inquiry would relate to the criminal
conduct and personal characteristics of the offenders and their
relationships to the punishment.220 An inquiry into the purposes of
punishment would focus on retribution and deterrence.221 While some
have argued that the death penalty does not satisfy the purposes of
retribution,222 it seems unlikely that state supreme courts with elected
judges would accept such an argument. The social science evidence
demonstrates that the death penalty, particularly as used in the United
States, does not deter,223 but states may not accept that argument either.
The Nebraska constitution224 is almost identical to the Eighth
Amendment but proscribes the infliction of a singular punishment that is
cruel and unusual instead of the plural punishments of the Eighth
Amendment. The analysis here would likely be the same as with the
identical provisions in Colorado, Idaho, and Utah.
216. See discussion supra Section II.B.
217. See discussion supra Section I.A.
218. See discussion supra Section II.B.
219. See discussion supra Section I.B.
220. See generally William W. Berry III, Separating Retribution from Proportionality, 97
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF (2011) (discussing the proportionality inquiry and advocating for “a broader
concept of proportionality” to “better achieve the goal of a more intelligible and robust Eighth
Amendment”); Stinneford, supra note 144 (discussing proportionality and advocating that it
“should be measured primarily in relation to prior punishment practice”).
221. See discussion supra Section I.A. Dangerousness is not usually relevant as a
justification for the death penalty. See William W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness: A
Path to the De Facto Abolition of the Death Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 893 (2010). While the
death penalty also usually does not satisfy the purpose of rehabilitation, some have argued that it
is relevant nonetheless. See Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1231, 1234 (2013).
222. See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV.
407, 458–60 (2005).
223. See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital
Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 751, 753–56 (2005).
224. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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The Montana constitution225 likewise uses identical language to the
Eighth Amendment but also adds a separate provision that requires that
government action respect the dignity of the offender. If Montana courts
examined only the cruel and unusual question, the analysis would be
similar to Colorado, Idaho, and Utah. If Montana courts focused on the
dignity question, the analysis would be broader and center on the ways in
which capital punishment might infringe on the offender’s dignity, both
as a substantive matter and with respect to methods of execution.226
The Oregon constitution227 uses identical “cruel and unusual
punishments” language but also adds a requirement that all penalties be
proportional to the offense. This state would engage in a similar analysis
to Colorado, Idaho, and Utah. The difference is that the proportionality
analysis that might be part of the Colorado, Idaho, and Utah analysis
would definitely be part of the Oregon analysis.
The constitutions of Kentucky228 and South Dakota229 prohibit cruel
punishments but not unusual ones. This means that Kentucky courts
would have to read the requirement of unusual into the state constitution
and make the second step of deciding that unusual punishments alone
violate the state constitution. As discussed above, the first analytical
move seems possible, but the second one seems far less likely.
B. Evolved Standards States
1. The States (Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia)
a. Arizona
Of Arizona’s fifteen counties, eight are represented on death row and
eight have executed an offender since 1976.230 On its face, then,
Arizona’s death penalty, as an intrastate inquiry, does not seem to be
unusual.
A closer examination, though, of Arizona’s county-by-county
practices may suggest that the standards are evolving toward abolition in
Arizona. Of the thirty-seven executions conducted by the state since
225. MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 22.
226. See William W. Berry III & Meghan J. Ryan, Cruel Techniques, Unusual Secrets, 78
OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 437 (2017); Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the
Backdrop of the Eighth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2129, 2131 (2016).
227. OR. CONST. art. I, § 16.
228. KY. CONST. § 17.
229. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 23.
230. See Arizona Counties by Population, ARIZ. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.arizona-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/S9GZ-BJES];
see also The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
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1976, twenty-four of them have come from convictions in Pima (thirteen)
and Maricopa (eleven) counties.231 Of the 121 inmates currently on death
row, the overwhelming majority (over 80%) were convicted in Pima
(twenty) and Maricopa (eighty-four) counties.232
With two out of fifteen counties (13%) responsible for roughly 80%
of the death sentences and executions in Arizona, the death penalty
increasingly appears to be unusual in Arizona, as it is almost nonexistent
in counties other than Pima and Maricopa.
b. Arkansas
Despite its wild execution spree in 2017,233 Arkansas arguably
engages in execution practices that are unusual intrastate or that are at
least moving in that direction. Of the thirty-two inmates on death row in
Arkansas, only twenty-two of the state’s seventy-five counties (29%) are
represented.234 Similarly, of the state’s thirty-two executions since the
reinstatement of the death penalty, the convictions came from nineteen
different counties (25%).235
Pulaski County in Arkansas is responsible for six executions and four
of the inmates on death row, making it an outlier in the state.236
Removing the 20% of death row that Pulaski is responsible for makes
Arkansas look even less like a state regularly engaged in the use of the
death penalty.
c. Georgia
Georgia has executed seventy-two inmates since 1976, with
convictions from thirty-nine of the state’s 159 counties (23%).237 Of the
fifty-three inmates currently on Georgia’s death row, thirty-one counties
231. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
232. See FINS, supra note 165, at 42; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also Arizona, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federalinfo/state-by-state/arizona [https://perma.cc/XX77-CEJF] (discussing the history of the death
penalty in Arizona).
233. Arkansas Performs Double Execution Amid Allegations of Botched Lethal Injection,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://archive.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6747 [https://perma.cc/
JRV3-R4LP].
234. See Arkansas Counties by Population, ARK. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.arkansas-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/FPD5KA5Z]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
235. See FINS, supra note 165, at 42; Death Row, supra note 166; The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165.
236. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
237. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; Georgia Counties by Population, GA. DEMOGRAPHICS
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.georgia-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://
perma.cc/H2YE-8K29]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
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(19%) are represented.238 Over one-third of the current death row inmates
in Georgia come from four counties: Baldwin (three), Chatham (four),
Cobb (five), and Fulton (five).239 Georgia has also only sentenced four
offenders to death in the last decade.240 In light of the low percentage of
counties using the death penalty and sentencing offenders to death, one
can reasonably conclude that the use of the death penalty in Georgia is
unusual, particularly in recent years given its intrastate use across its 159
counties.
d. Indiana
Indiana has used the death penalty only rarely since its reinstatement
in 1976, executing twenty inmates during that time period.241 The current
Indiana death row is sparse as well, with only nine inmates. 242 Of
Indiana’s ninety-two counties, only thirteen (14%) have been responsible
for the execution of an inmate.243 Similarly, only nine counties (10%)
currently have convicted individuals on death row in Indiana.244 As a
result, it is not difficult to determine, as a matter of intrastate county
counting, that Indiana’s death penalty is an unusual punishment.
e. Louisiana
Louisiana has executed twenty-eight inmates since the reinstatement
of the death penalty and currently has sixty-nine offenders on death
row.245 Of the sixty-four parishes in Louisiana, fourteen have been
responsible for executions (22%) and twenty have imposed death

238. See FINS, supra note 165, at 51; Death Row, supra note 166; Georgia Counties by
Population, supra note 237; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165 (estimating that
there are fifty-six inmates currently on death row); see also Georgia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/georgia-1 [https://perma.cc/G7RQ-XADV] (discussing the history of
the death penalty in Georgia).
239. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
240. See Georgia, supra note 238.
241. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
242. See FINS, supra note 165, at 52; Indiana, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/indiana [https://perma.cc/CHP5
-WSQ8] (estimating that there are eleven inmates currently on death row).
243. See Indiana Counties by Population, IND. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.indiana-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/PKA5MD8N]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
244. See Indiana Counties by Population, supra note 243; The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165.
245. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8, 53; see also Louisiana, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/louisiana [https://perma.cc/
BT35-UZXM] (estimating that there are seventy inmates currently on death row).
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sentences on the offenders currently on death row (31%).246 Four parishes
in particular are collectively responsible for 59% (forty-one out of sixtynine) of the current death sentences: Caddo (thirteen), East Baton Rouge
(fifteen), Jefferson (seven), and Orleans (six).247 Although closer to the
margin, it is possible in light of these facts to find that, as a matter of
intrastate comparison, Louisiana’s use of the death penalty is unusual.
f. Mississippi
Since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976, Mississippi has
executed twenty-one inmates convicted in fourteen different counties out
of the eighty-two in the state (17%).248 The death row inmates in
Mississippi received their death sentences in twenty-five different
counties (30% of counties).249 The current death sentences are fairly
evenly distributed among the counties in the state, but the overwhelming
percentage of counties that have not been responsible for an execution250
and the fairly large percentage of counties that have not sentenced anyone
on death row both suggest that the Mississippi death penalty is unusual,
at least with respect to county counting as a proxy for evolving standards.
g. Missouri
Missouri has been a fairly active death penalty state by comparison,
executing eighty-eight offenders from twenty-nine of the state’s 114
counties (25%) since 1976.251 Missouri also currently incarcerates
twenty-four inmates on its death row from fifteen counties (13%).252 Of
these twenty-four inmates, six (25%) were sentenced in St. Louis County
246. See Louisiana Counties by Population, LA. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.louisiana-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/PTU5SB3F]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
247. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
248. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; Mississippi Counties by Population, MISS.
DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.mississippi-demographics.com/counties_by_
population [https://perma.cc/KQ7Q-KXMU]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note
165; Mississippi, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federalinfo/state-by-state/mississippi [https://perma.cc/DS8H-8RN6].
249. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
250. See id.
251. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; Missouri Counties by Population, MO. DEMOGRAPHICS
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.missouri-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://
perma.cc/5TMW-F4BB] (listing the number of counties in Missouri); The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165.
252. See FINS, supra note 165, at 54; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also Current Inmates, MO. DEATH ROW, https://missourideathrow.com/current-inmates/
[https://perma.cc/DC9L-EVVE] (estimating the number of inmates currently on death row to be
as high as forty inmates in twenty-three counties).
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or St. Louis City.253 Given the reduced percentage of counties involved
in executing inmates and sentencing inmates to death, it is possible to
conclude that the death penalty in Missouri is unusual, at least in terms
of county counting under the evolving standards of decency.
h. South Carolina
In South Carolina, forty-three inmates from nineteen of the state’s
forty-six counties (41%) have been executed since 1976.254 The South
Carolina death row currently houses thirty-eight inmates from twentyone counties (48%).255 These numbers would typically not lead to a
conclusion that the state’s use of the death penalty is unusual in light of
its intrastate usage.
The state, however, has only sentenced three people to death since
2013 (7% of counties) and only one in the past five years.256 South
Carolina has also conducted only three executions in the past decade (7%
of counties) and none since 2011.257 South Carolina’s recent move away
from the death penalty supports a conclusion that its death penalty use is
unusual, at least over the past decade, with respect to the counties that
actually are using it.
i. Tennessee
Tennessee has executed nine inmates since 1976, from eight of the
state’s ninety-five counties (8%).258 Its current death row houses fiftyeight offenders, from seventeen of the state’s ninety-five counties
(18%).259 Almost 70% of Tennessee death row inmates come from four
253. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; see also Current Inmates,
supra note 252 (estimating the number of inmates currently on death row to be as high as sixteen
inmates in two counties).
254. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; see
also South Carolina Counties by Population, S.C. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.southcarolina-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/NEC925UE] (listing the number of counties in South Carolina).
255. See FINS, supra note 165, at 59; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also S.C. DEP’T CORR., DEATH ROW LIST (2019), http://www.doc.sc.gov/news/death-rowreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK88-B6JG] (estimating the number of inmates currently on death
row to be as high as thirty-eight inmates in twenty-two counties).
256. See South Carolina, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/southcarolina-1 [https://perma.cc/7CM7-VXTE]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
257. See South Carolina, supra note 256.
258. See FINS, supra note 165, at 9; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also Tennessee Counties by Population, TENN. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.
tennessee-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/GW9E-ZKKT] (listing
the number of counties in Tennessee).
259. See FINS, supra note 165, at 60; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also Death Row Offenders, TENN. DEP’T CORRECTION, https://www.tn.gov/content/tn/
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counties: Shelby (twenty-seven), Davidson (six), Knox (four), and
Hamilton (three).260 And almost 50% come from Shelby County. Given
the narrow distribution of death sentences and the overall low percentage
of Tennessee counties that have been responsible for executions or that
have sentenced current death row inmates, it appears that Tennessee’s use
of the death penalty is unusual, at least at the county level.
j. Virginia
Virginia is one of the few states that do not have a decade-long gap
between the imposition of a death sentence and the imposition of an
execution.261 Since 1976, Virginia has executed 113 inmates, drawn from
forty-four of the Commonwealth’s ninety-four counties (47%).262
Currently, Virginia has a mere three inmates on death row—two from
Norfolk and one from Fairfax County (2% of counties).263
Perhaps more telling, though, is that the Commonwealth of Virginia
has not sentenced an offender to death in the past six years and has
sentenced only three in the past decade, meaning that only 2% of Virginia
counties are represented.264 Likewise, the Commonwealth has executed
nine inmates in the past decade from eight counties (less than 10% of
counties).265
Historically, Virginia’s use of the death penalty has not been unusual,
but a close examination of its use over the past decade suggests that the
death penalty is presently unusual as applied, at least in light of the
counting of counties under the evolving standards.

correction/statistics-and-information/death-row-facts/death-row-offenders.html [https://perma.
cc/6M9S-KFJ6] (estimating the number of inmates currently on death row to be as high as fiftyfive inmates in sixteen counties).
260. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; see also Death Row Facts,
TENN. DEP’T CORRECTION, https://www.tn.gov/correction/statistics-and-information/death-rowfacts.html [https://perma.cc/JP9J-MRAW] (estimating that there are fifty-six people on death
row).
261. See Virginia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-andfederal-info/state-by-state/virginia [https://perma.cc/6MC5-SFWL]; see also Death Row, supra
note 166 (listing the number of death row prisoners in Virginia).
262. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
Virginia, supra note 261; see also Virginia Counties by Population, VA. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6,
2018), https://www.virginia-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/HZ4B
-DD56] (listing the number of counties in Virginia).
263. See FINS, supra note 165, at 62; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also Virginia’s Death Row Inmates, VIRGINIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO DEATH PENALTY,
https://www.vadp.org/dp-info/virginias-death-row-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/YG9W-4LXK].
264. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; Virginia, supra note 261.
265. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
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2. Possible State Constitutional Consequences
Two of the states in the evolved states category have disjunctive
constitutions—Arkansas266 and Mississippi267—and thus the analysis
would be the same as in California, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming.268 Arkansas and Mississippi are the most obvious candidates
for violating a state constitution, as a simple demonstration of
unusualness violates the Eighth Amendment analogue.
Louisiana269 has disjunctive language but also proscribes excessive
punishments. The best reading of this constitutional provision would be
as having separate requirements like Arkansas and Mississippi, but a state
court could also read the three ideas collectively as requiring that a
punishment have some kind of cruelty or disproportionality to violate the
state constitution.
South Carolina270 also has disjunctive language in its state
constitution, as well as a proscription against corporal punishment. This
difference should not be meaningful, at least with respect to the
constitutionality of unusual punishments under the state constitution. The
analysis should thus follow the analysis described above for California,
Kansas, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming.271
Several of the states—Arizona,272 Georgia,273 Tennessee,274 and
Virginia275—have identical state constitutional language to the Eighth
Amendment.276 The analysis here should track that described above for
Colorado, Idaho, and Utah.277
Missouri278 has identical language to the Eighth Amendment except
that it uses the singular “punishment” instead of the plural
“punishments.”279 This difference likely is not meaningful with respect
to assessing unusual punishments. The analysis should thus track the
analysis above for Colorado, Idaho, and Utah.280

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

ARK. CONST. art. II, § 9.
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 28.
See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 20.
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15.
GA. CONST. art. I, § I, ¶ XVII.
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
MO. CONST. art. I, § 21.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
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Indiana281 uses identical language to the Eighth Amendment in its
state constitution but also adds a separate proportionality requirement.
The analysis here should follow the same approach as described above
for Oregon, which has a similar constitutional provision.
C. Status Quo States (For Now)
1. The States (Alabama, Florida, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Texas)
a. Alabama
Alabama is a state where the intrastate standards of decency have not
yet evolved to the level of unusualness, despite annual decreases in the
number of new death sentences.282 For the past decade, the state has
sentenced ten or fewer offenders to death per year—a decline from prior
practices.283
Of the sixty-seven counties in Alabama, forty-one (61%) have
sentenced an offender to death since 1976, resulting in a total of 181
inmates on death row.284 By contrast, Alabama’s executions since 1976
have been more narrowly distributed, with twenty-six out of twentyseven counties (39%) having convicted an executed inmate. Of the sixtyfour executions, two counties—Mobile (ten) and Jefferson (twelve)—are
responsible for one-third of them.285
b. Florida
Since 1976, Florida has executed ninety-seven inmates from thirtyfour of its sixty-seven counties (51%).286 The state currently has 349
inmates on its death row, from fifty of its sixty-seven counties (75%),287
281. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
282. Alabama, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/alabama-0#sent
[https://perma.cc/L2JN-TFMW].
283. Id.
284. See FINS, supra note 165, at 40; Death Row, supra note 166; The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165; see also Alabama Counties by Population, ALA. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec.
6, 2018), https://www.alabama-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/
5MQS-AEKB] (listing the number of counties in Alabama).
285. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165
(estimating that sixty-six inmates were executed).
286. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165
(estimating that there have been ninety-nine executions); Florida Counties by Population, FLA.
DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.florida-demographics.com/counties_by_population
[https://perma.cc/7RWU-8F69].
287. See FINS, supra note 165, at 49; Death Row, supra note 166; The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165; see also Corrections Offender Network: Death Row Roster, FLA. DEP’T
CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/OffenderSearch/deathrowroster.aspx [https://perma.cc/
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although many have appeals pending in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hurst v. Florida.288 By any measure, the frequency and
breadth of Florida’s death penalty is not unusual intrastate. Nonetheless,
the number of new Florida death sentences continues to decrease over
time, with less than ten new sentences in each of the past five years.289
c. Nevada
Nevada has only executed twelve offenders since the reinstatement of
the death penalty in 1976.290 These executions came from just two of
Nevada’s seventeen counties (11.76%)—Clark (eight) and Washoe
(four).291 Nevada currently has seventy-four inmates on its death row but
does not have a publicly available list that links each to a particular
county.292 Given the volume of sentences and the small number of
counties, it is unlikely that Nevada’s death penalty is unusual unless all
of the sentences are clustered in one or two counties as the executions
were.
d. North Carolina
North Carolina has executed forty-three inmates since 1976, with
twenty-six of 100 counties (26%) responsible.293 North Carolina
A3CN-8KSN] (estimating that the number of inmates on death row, as of September 4, 2019, is
340).
288. 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016) (holding that the judicial override violated the Sixth
Amendment); see Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing
After Hurst, 66 UCLA L. REV. 448, 476–77 (2019) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hurst invalidated Florida’s capital sentencing system); Hurst v. Florida, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/hurst-v-florida [https://perma.cc/3M2M-L5LB]
(discussing the impact on Florida post-Hurst, and noting that many sentences have been reviewed
in light of Hurst, but more have still not been reviewed).
289. See Florida, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/florida-1
[https://perma.cc/V44L-L5EP].
290. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; see also Nevada, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/nevada [https://perma.cc/ELC37V63].
291. See Nevada Counties by Population, NEV. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.nevada-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/9C2E-TUVJ];
The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
292. FINS, supra note 165, at 54; see also Nevada, supra note 290 (estimating that there are
seventy-six inmates currently on death row).
293. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; North Carolina’s 100 Counties, NCPEDIA,
https://www.ncpedia.org/geography/counties [https://perma.cc/23RB-APZL] (stating that the
number of counties in North Carolina is 100); The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note
165; see also North Carolina, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-andfederal-info/state-by-state/north-carolina [https://perma.cc/WBD5-XLKG] (discussing notable
exonerations in North Carolina).
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currently has 143 death row inmates, who are sentenced to death in fiftythree of the 100 counties (53%).294 Three counties—Forsyth (fourteen),
Wake (eleven), and Cumberland (ten)—account for almost one-quarter
of the current death row population.295
While its current county composition of death sentences does not rise
to the level of unusual, North Carolina may be moving in that direction.
The state has not executed anyone since 2006296 and has not imposed a
new death sentence in three out of the past five years.297
e. Ohio
Ohio has executed fifty-six offenders since 1976, drawn from twenty
of the state’s eighty-eight counties (23%).298 Currently, Ohio has 141
inmates sentenced to death in thirty-six of the state’s eighty-eight
counties (36%).299 Almost 40% of Ohio’s death row comes from three
counties: Cuyahoga (nineteen), Hamilton (twenty-four), and Franklin
(eleven).300 The breadth of the distribution of Ohio’s death sentences
suggests that it is not quite unusual on a county level but may not be that
far from its standards evolving in that direction over time.
f. Oklahoma
Oklahoma has executed 112 offenders since 1976, with thirty-one of
the state’s seventy-seven counties (40%) responsible for those

294. See FINS, supra note 165, at 55; North Carolina’s 100 Counties, supra note 293; The
Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; see also Death Row Roster, N.C. DEP’T
PUB. SAFETY, https://www.ncdps.gov/adult-corrections/prisons/death-penalty/death-row-roster
[https://perma.cc/3AB4-ZQRU] (estimating that there are 142 inmates currently on death row).
295. See Death Row Roster, supra note 294 (estimating that there are thirteen inmates
currently on death row in Forsyth); North Carolina, supra note 293; The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165.
296. See North Carolina, supra note 293.
297. Id.
298. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; see
also Ohio, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/stateby-state/ohio [https://perma.cc/CMJ9-VJE6] (discussing the history of the death penalty in Ohio);
Ohio Counties by Population, OHIO DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ohiodemographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/XF8Y-VU89] (listing the number
of counties in Ohio).
299. See FINS, supra note 165, at 56; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also Death Row: Ohio, OHIO DEP’T REHABILITATION & CORRECTION,
https://drc.ohio.gov/death-row [https://perma.cc/AS8S-RWPM] (estimating that there are 138
inmates currently on death row sentenced in thirty-five of the state’s counties).
300. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; see also Death Row: Ohio,
supra note 299 (estimating that twenty-three people were sentenced to death row in Cuyahoga
and nineteen people were sentenced to death row in Hamilton).
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executions.301 Oklahoma has forty-seven inmates on its death row from
fifteen different counties (19%).302 Oklahoma County is responsible for
an astounding forty-one of the 112 post-Gregg executions (37%) and
twenty-five of the forty-seven death row inmates (53%).303 The small
number of non-Oklahoma County inmates (twenty per seventy-six
counties) adds to the idea that Oklahoma’s use of the death penalty is
unusual. Currently, though, it is not clear that Oklahoma’s death penalty
is unusual as applied, although it is arguably moving in that direction.
g. Texas
Texas has conducted far more executions (560) than any other state
since 1976.304 These 560 executions came from ninety-six of Texas’s 254
counties (38%).305 Four counties—Bexar (forty-five), Dallas (sixty-one),
Harris (129), and Tarrant (forty-two)—are responsible for almost 70% of
the executions in Texas post-Gregg.306
Texas currently houses roughly 225 inmates on death row, sentenced
to death in fifty-three of Texas’s 254 counties (21%).307 Again, four
counties—Bexar (nine), Dallas (twenty-four), Harris (seventy-seven),
and Tarrant (sixteen)—account for a significant percentage of the inmates
(56%), with Harris County alone accounting for over one-third.308 The
percentages of county participation do not quite lead to the conclusion
301. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; Oklahoma Counties by Population, OKLA.
DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.oklahoma-demographics.com/counties_by_
population [https://perma.cc/AWJ4-L36H]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165;
see also Oklahoma, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federalinfo/state-by-state/oklahoma [https://perma.cc/6JF6-XBM8] (discussing, among other things, the
history of the death penalty in Oklahoma).
302. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; Death Row, supra note 166; Death Row Monthly Roster,
OK.GOV, http://doc.ok.gov/Websites/doc/images/Documents/DRMR%203-1-2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G6LA-ZQQ9]; The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
303. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165; Death Row, supra note 166.
304. See FINS, supra note 165, at 8; see also Texas, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/texas [https://perma.cc/26Y2TWXU] (estimating that Texas has executed 566 inmates since 1976); The Clustering of the Death
Penalty, supra note 165 (estimating that 565 inmates have been executed in Texas).
305. See Texas Counties by Population, TEX. DEMOGRAPHICS (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.texas-demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/UHM2-JYXN];
The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165 (showing the executions by county in Texas).
306. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
307. See FINS, supra note 165, at 60; see also Death Row Information: County of Conviction
for Offenders on Death Row, TEX. DEP’T CRIM. JUST., https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/death_row/
dr_county_conviction_offenders.html [https://perma.cc/KZ4T-QG9M] (estimating that Texas
currently has 215 inmates on death row); The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165
(estimating that there are 223 inmates currently on death row).
308. See The Clustering of the Death Penalty, supra note 165.
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that the intrastate county sentencing practices make the death penalty
unusual in Texas yet, but the clustering in a few counties suggests that
future evolution might reach that point. The marked decrease in death
sentences over the past decade in Texas likewise points in that
direction.309
2. Possible State Constitutional Consequences
The states in this category likely do not currently violate their
constitutions because their use of the death penalty is not (yet) unusual.
If the states do evolve over time, it is worth assessing where their
constitutions fall on the spectrum of Eighth Amendment analogues.
Five of the seven states in this category—Alabama,310 Nevada,311
North Carolina,312 Oklahoma,313 and Texas314—have disjunctive
constitutions that proscribe cruel “or” unusual punishments. As with
Arkansas, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and Wyoming, simple recognition by state courts of the
unusualness of the use of the death penalty would be enough to find that
the death penalty, as applied, violates their state constitutions.
Ohio315 employs identical language in its state constitution to that in
the Eighth Amendment. As such, the analysis would follow the analysis
described above for Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Tennessee, Utah,
and Virginia.316
The Florida constitution317 explicitly references the Eighth
Amendment and mandates that the meaning of the state constitution in
capital cases follow directly from the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
Irrespective of how unusual the Florida death penalty might become, it
will not violate the state constitution unless the U.S. Supreme Court
declares the death penalty unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
IV. THE CASE FOR BARRING UNUSUAL STATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS
Given the likelihood that many state capital punishment schemes
violate their state constitutions because the death penalty has become
unusual in their states, it seems appropriate that states should apply this
concept to bar the death penalty. After emphasizing the importance of
309. See Texas, supra note 304 (depicting a decrease in death sentences over the past decade
in Texas).
310. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15.
311. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 6.
312. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27.
313. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 9.
314. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
315. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9.
316. See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
317. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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according meaning to state constitutional provisions, this Part concludes
by highlighting many of the policy reasons why state supreme courts
should not hesitate to apply the argument advanced in Part III.
A. Capital Punishments Are Unusual in Many States
For a constitution to have value, one must accord meaning to its
language. The concept of unusual punishments is not an idea embedded
in an obscure corner of one or two state constitutions. Rather, it is a core
idea that helps define the limits that states place on their ability to punish
criminal offenders. And the prohibition against imposing unusual
punishments remains ubiquitous in the language of state constitutions.
Given that so many states proscribe this kind of punishment, and that
so many capital punishment states use the death penalty in an unusual
manner, state supreme courts should decide to intervene and prevent
current and future violations of their state constitutions.
At least eight states—Arkansas, California, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wyoming—have
disjunctive constitutions and have an intrastate distribution of capital
punishment that is unusual on the county level.318 A move in this
direction by these states has the potential benefit of safety in numbers.
Nationally, only sixteen out of 3,143 counties (less than 1%) returned five
or more death sentences in the six-year period between 2010 and 2015.319
B. Judicial Political Accountability
Unlike the federal system where judges have life tenure, most state
judges are elected. As a result, there exists a higher level of political
accountability, at least in theory, for state supreme court justices than
U.S. Supreme Court Justices. While the status of a justice as elected or
appointed does not particularly matter in the abstract, it can help to
address arguments against court application of state constitutional law to
limit the actions of the legislature.
The counter-majoritarian difficulty posits the concern that judicial
review of statutes under constitutions provides an opportunity for a few
justices to negate or overturn the will of the people by striking down laws

318. See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
319. Death Penalty, FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, http://fairpunishment.org/category/deathpenalty/ [https://perma.cc/D7SR-J7EA]. These counties were: Los Angeles (California),
Riverside (California), Orange (California), Kern (California), San Bernardino (California),
Maricopa (Arizona), Clark (Nevada), Dallas (Texas), Harris (Texas), Caddo Parish (Louisiana),
Mobile (Alabama), Jefferson (Alabama), Duval (Florida), Miami-Dade (Florida), Pinellas
(Florida), and Hillsborough (Florida). Id.
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adopted by popularly elected officials.320 The general idea here relates to
the concept of limited, circumspect judicial review. As the opinions of
five justices (or a majority of the state supreme court whatever the size)
should not overrule the will of the electorate based purely on differing
normative views, the counter-majoritarian difficulty counsels against
such “judicial activism” to the extent that constitutional interpretation
serves as a pretext for imposing one’s ideological views.321
In the context of applying unusualness to state capital punishments,
the counter-majoritarian concerns do not carry significant weight. This is
in part because the concept of unusualness relies on majoritarian norms,
not counter-majoritarian norms. To the extent that a state supreme court
suppresses the actions of a particular county in limiting its ability to
impose the death penalty, it would be doing so in the name of the vast
majority of counties within the state that approach the death penalty in a
different way.
In addition to the majoritarian underpinnings of the doctrine in
question, the elected character of state supreme court justices allows for
political accountability. If constituents disagree with a court’s application
of the state constitution to state punishments, constituents have the ability
to vote justices out during the next election. While having elected justices
may raise other concerns, the idea of unaccountable, overreaching
judicial review is not one of them.
C. State Constitutions Are Not Fixed
A similar concern with the Supreme Court interpreting the meaning
of the Constitution rests on the concept that the only way to undo such an
interpretation is to have the Court overrule itself in a later decision. While
certainly possible, the Court rejecting a prior opinion is unlikely
particularly because the Court usually adheres to the doctrine of stare
decisis in making decisions.
Further, the U.S. Constitution is extremely difficult to amend.
Amending the Constitution requires a supermajority within each state and
320. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–17 (1962); Barry
Friedman, The History of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Part One]; Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Two: Reconstruction’s
Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, Part Two]; Barry Friedman,
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2001) [hereinafter Friedman, Part Three]; Barry Friedman, The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 984 (2000)
[hereinafter Friedman, Part Four]; Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002)
[hereinafter Friedman, Part Five].
321. See Friedman, Part Two, supra note 320, at 24–25.
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a supermajority of the states to approve an amendment.322 As a result, the
adoption of a constitutional amendment in response to, or to otherwise
correct, a decision by the Supreme Court is unlikely in almost every
situation.323
State constitutions, by contrast, are much more malleable. States often
hold referenda or voting initiatives to amend the state constitution, or
otherwise gain voter input on a particular issue. This also applies to the
death penalty. In 2016, both California and Nebraska used ballot
initiatives to assess whether to abolish or keep the death penalty.324
In short, an interpretation of state constitutional language by a state
supreme court does not carry the same level of finality or irrevocability
that an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by the U.S. Supreme Court
does. States often amend their constitutions; state supreme court justices
do not often engage in interpretation that is not later subject to change if
a majority of citizens disagree or do not embrace the consequences.
D. A Check Against Rogue Prosecutors
Another entirely unrelated policy rationale supports the robust
limitation of unusual state capital punishments—the absence of any
check against state prosecutors. While some prosecutors face political
consequences through election, many such elections do not involve
challenges, and incumbency among prosecutors remains extremely
high.325 Further, many of the prosecutors that work in the district
attorneys’ offices are career employees and face no political electoral
accountability.
The report on prosecutors from the Fair Punishment Project—
America’s Five Deadliest Prosecutors—highlights this problem.326
According to the report, five prosecutors327 are responsible for 440 death

322. See U.S. CONST. art. V. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending
the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1046 n.2 (1988); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561, 1573 (1998).
323. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 322, at 1083; Chemerinsky, supra note 322, at 1569.
324. Mark Berman, Nebraska and California Voters Decide to Keep the Death Penalty,
WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016, 5:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/
2016/11/09/nebraska-and-california-voters-decide-to-keep-the-death-penalty/?noredirect=on
[https://perma.cc/56KQ-LHWW].
325. See Andrew Novak, It’s Too Dangerous to Elect Prosecutors, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 14,
2017, 9:50 AM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/its-too-dangerous-to-elect-prosecutors
[https://perma.cc/J38N-5NAF].
326. FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, AMERICA’S TOP FIVE DEADLIEST PROSECUTORS: HOW
OVERZEALOUS PERSONALITIES DRIVE THE DEATH PENALTY 4 (2016).
327. Id. at 3. These prosecutors are: Joe Freeman Britt of Robeson County, North
Carolina; Donnie Myers of Lexington County, South Carolina; Bob Macy of Oklahoma County,
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sentences—one out of every seven inmates on death row.328 Even more
troubling, a number of these sentences were reversed because of error and
misconduct on the part of the prosecutors.329 These individuals help
create the unusual death sentences that violate their respective state
constitutions.
If state courts are willing to restrict unusual punishments under state
constitutions, judges could counteract the unregulated power over life
that state prosecutors regularly exercise. Given the number of states
engaging in unusual capital punishments (twenty-three out of thirty
capital states, or 77%), it is time for state courts to give their state
constitutions meaning by limiting unconstitutional death sentences.330
CONCLUSION
This Article has advanced the argument that most state capital
sentences are unusual and, in many cases, in violation of the applicable
provisions of the governing state constitution. Part I of this Article
explained the concept of unusualness under the Eighth Amendment as
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its cases. In Part II, this Article
explored the Eighth Amendment analogues in state constitutions that
similarly prohibit unusual punishments and the conjunctive and
disjunctive language of the state constitutions, before demonstrating how
the Eighth Amendment approach could translate to the analysis of
unusualness under state constitutional law. Part III then examined the
states that have unusual proscriptions in their state constitutions, and
categorizes the states based on the likelihood that their use of the death
penalty violates their state constitutions. Finally, in Part IV, this Article
argued for an expansive application of state constitutions to bar unusual
state capital punishments, exploring the policy reasons supporting this
analytical move. Indeed, state constitutional law provides a ripe area for
revisiting the use of the death penalty, which continues to be, as it has
since Furman, an unusual and unconstitutional punishment.

Oklahoma; Lynne Abraham of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania; and Johnny Holmes of Harris
County, Texas. Id.
328. Id. at 18.
329. Id. at 5, 8–9, 11–13; see also Ed Pilkington, America’s Deadliest Prosecutors: Five
Lawyers, 440 Death Sentences, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2016/jun/29/us-deadliest-prosecutors-death-penalty-five-attorneys-justice-system
?CMP=share_btn_fb [https://perma.cc/SCP8-W8ZP]; Robert J. Smith, America’s Deadliest
Prosecutors, SLATE (May 14, 2015, 3:54 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/05/
americas-deadliest-prosecutors-death-penalty-sentences-in-louisiana-florida-oklahoma.html
[https://perma.cc/GJ6G-3G5Q].
330. See discussion supra Part III.
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